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Foreword
The Economic Transition and Integration (ETI) Project at the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) started a research activity on the behavior of Rus-
sian enterprises under liberalization, privatization and restructuring in 1995{1996. This
activity originated upon the initiative of the Ministry of Economy of the Russian Fed-
eration. The major reason for focusing on this subject was the fact that the current
state and further transformation of Russian medium and large sized enterprises became
a challenge for the continuation and success of transition related reforms. Despite cer-
tain positive tendencies, numerous enterprises still adjust themselves to ongoing changes
without considerable market adaptation and modernization. The emerging ownership
structure and nancial markets demonstrate limited positive inuence on stockholders'
incentives, decision-making process and strategies of restructuring.
In the course of these enterprise studies, a workshop on \Russian Enterprises on the
Path of Market Adaptation and Restructuring" was organized at IIASA on 1{3 February
1996. Russian and Western experts, extensively working in the area of enterprise perfor-
mance under transition, focused the discussions on recent empirical ndings and analyses
concerning the following issues: typical models of enterprise behavior; development of the
nancial situation at the enterprises and its determinants; impact of emerging markets
and competition on enterprises; the consequences of privatization and patterns of restruc-
turing; and enterprise social assets divestiture and conversion. The workshop arrived at
both analytical conclusions and recommendations for policy measures stimulating \con-
structive" enterprise behavior. Possibilities for a joint research project on the motivations
and behavior of enterprises in transition economies were also discussed.
The circulation of selected workshop papers as IIASA Working Papers is undertaken
in order to provoke broad discussions of presented analytical results. This paper by Dr.
Alexander S. Bim examines challenging processes of ownership transformation at Russian
privatized enterprises and their impact on investments and other key factors of enterprise
restructuring. Analysis is focused on controversial behavioral strategies of managers and
other new owners.
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
Abstract
This paper examines challenging processes of ownership transformation of Russian pri-
vatized enterprises. The major tendency is steady and continuous dierentiation of the
insider stock on that of managers and that of non-managerial employees. Therefore,
wide-spread managerial control is in a process of successful transformation into control of
managers-owners.
Managers demonstrate controversial behavioral strategies. The minor part of them
utilizes control over enterprises for active market adaptation and restructuring, while
the most of directors are much more devoted to intensive income and capital extraction
for their own short-term benets. Advantages and shortcomings of both strategies from
macro- and microeconomic standpoints are revealed in the paper.
In order to make the process of ownership concentration more consistent and irre-
versible, top managers create and strengthen in-enterprise managerial coalitions. It is
argued that these coalitions are a peculiar and signicant feature of an on-going concen-
tration of enterprise stock; in addition to them, outside managerial coalitions are emerging
on the basis of mutual penetration of stock of technologically related companies. The lat-
ter pave a path to changes in existing enterprise boundaries.
A portion of outsider investors, who own or control Russian enterprises still remains
low, although there was slight growth during 1994{1995. Not only is the relatively modest
nancial potential an obstacle, but the strong unwillingness of enterprise managers to
exchange control and ownership for monetary inows, which in principle could be provided
by interested outsiders, as well.
Actual outsider owners do not demonstrate less problematic incentives and behavior
than managers. Hence, the problem of ecient corporate governance does not seem
to have synonymous solutions in Russia. Real characteristics of enterprise performance
under transition are more dependent on individuals in charge of companies, than on what
socio-economic group they represent.

Alexander S. Bim is a Research Scholar in the Economic Transition and Integration Project at IIASA
and Head of Department at the Institute of Market Economy, Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow,
Russia.
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The paper deals with the desirable functions of the state in the area of privatization
and enterpise performance. Given limited leverage of the current statehood on economic
developments, it is not clear enough whether suggested functions can be implemented.
1 Introduction
The speed and scale of Russian privatization were quite substantial during 1992{1994.
From the beginning of 1992, when nation-wide privatization started, 112 thousand small,
medium and large sized enterprises eventually changed the type of ownership, including
some 65 thousand during 1993{1994. Instead of former state enterprises joint-stock com-
panies with mixed ownership structure have been created in most cases. (See Frydman,
Rapaczynski and Earle, et al, (1993) and Bim, Jones and Weisskopf (1994) for a summary
on the methods and variants of privatization in Russia).
Privatized enterprises employ about 17 million people, which is 23% of the econom-
ically active population. (Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskoye Pologheniye Rossii, 1993{1994).
According to the VCIOM survey, done in early April 1995, a portion of privatized rms
within the standard enterprise-size categories appeared to be the following: among the
rms with 1,000 and more employees 35% were privatized; among those with 501{1,000
employees | 10%; among those with 201{500 employees | 17%, and among the compa-
nies with less than 200 sta members 20% were privatized. (New Russia Barometer IV,
1995).
Naturally, institutional changes of such a global size have drawn a lot of attention
towards their actual consequences, i.e., towards the impact of privatization on enterprise
economic status, behavior and development. Focusing on the consequences makes a lot
of sense: neither numbers of privatized entities nor volumes of circulating vouchers and
shares, but qualitative changes in ownership, patterns of control and decision-making, evi-
dence of market adaptation and restructuring of enterprises determine the real signicance
of the privatization campaign and results.
This paper examines institutional changes within the former state enterprises, follow-
ing the rst phases of Russian privatization. It focuses on the background for new patterns
of incentives and behavior, demonstrated by the most important economic agents involved
in enterprise performance in the course of privatization. Those patterns have already sig-
nicantly aected the economic status of privatized companies, restructuring perspectives
and further privatization developments, which are also the subject of this paper. More
concretely, the following issues are explored:
 Development of the structure of ownership. What are trends of modication, that
has occurred to ownership structure, predetermined by initial privatization proce-
dures | in-enterprise subscription for shares, voucher auctions, etc.? What kinds
of circulation of enterprise stock are typical and why? What does the current pro-
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portion between insider and outsider ownership look like? Are there any signicant
changes within insider and outsider stakes?
 Stereotypes of incentives and behavior of major stockholders. Strategies of insiders
and outsiders towards ownership, control and enterprise performance.
 The interrelation between ownership and control. Do transformations of ownership
structure lead to new patterns of control? Or, to put it more explicitly, are emerging
(modifying) and strengthening patterns of control over the enterprises adequate to
ownership structures, by which these patterns are supposed to be stipulated?
 Corporate governance or authoritarian control? What are the prospects for civilized
corporate governance in contemporary Russia?
 Relevant policy recommendations.
This paper is based partly on the outcome of enterprise surveys, which were conducted
by the author while working with the Russian Privatization Center.
1
For more about
the results see: Bim (1994a).
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Given the limited size of the sample surveyed and the
fact that in some respects, changes in enterprise performance were quite dynamic during
1994{1995, the latest empirical results, presented more recently by other researchers and
research teams, are broadly discussed in the paper and also involved in the analysis.
Since the author had interviewed enterprise directors, other managers and employees
personally, he did not only follow a formal questionnaire, but tried to maintain a dialogue
with respondents, to make them talk in order to extract both explicit and implicit in-
formation. Thus, not all the statements of this paper, although based on survey results,
may be supported by formal, quantitative characteristics. Therefore they could be con-
sidered by strict readers more as hypotheses. Some of such statements are strengthened
by the fact that they are completely conformable to conclusions, presented in literature.
But some statements sound dierent. Further empirical ndings will either conrm those
hypotheses or disprove them.
1
Under the auspices of the Russian Privatization Center, the author conducted in 1993 in-depth
interviews with general directors, top and middle-level managers and non-managerial employees of 24
enterprises, located in three regions of Russia | Far East (Primorskii kraj), Vologodskaya oblast and
Saratovskaya oblast. The sample reected quite dierent sectors of the economy: the wood processing
industry, machinery, light industry, food industry, construction, transport, military-industrial complex.
All the enterprises had completed the so-called initial privatization procedures (in-enterprise subscription
for shares, voucher and rst monetary auctions) and were privatized: the state retained not more than
25% of the stock. Observations were then continued in 1994.
2
Figures with no special quotation in this paper are taken either fromBim (1994a) or from unpublished
components of survey results, that are on the author's les.
3
2 Ownership Structure
The analysis, presented in this section, is focused on some major trends that predetermine
the formation of core stockholders and real control over the enterprises. For more general
observations of ownership structure dynamics see Boycko, Schleifer and Vishny (1995).
It is quite well known, that most of the enterprises have chosen the so-called second
option for privatization (for a description of Russian privatization general framework and
options see Frydman, Rapaczynski and Earle, et al, (1993) and Bim, Jones and Weisskopf,
(1994). In Bim's sample 83.3% of newly created joint-stock companies (transformed state
enterprises) had followed this path. The corresponding gure for all industrial enterprises
is 78% (Gurkov, 1995).
It was commonly supposed that the second option would lead to signicantly prevailing
insider ownership with all the inherent characteristics, appreciated by adepts of this type of
property relations (of so-called collective ownership) and blamed by its critics (for debate
see Bim et al, 1994). While not including a theoretical discussion here, it is necessary to
mention that insider ownership has, in fact, become quite widespread. According to Blasi
and Shleifer (1994) insiders held about 65% of enterprise shares in 1993.
At the same time insider ownership in Russia has manifested itself as a peculiar phe-
nomenon. First, it diers from that advocated by East European and Western enthusiasts
as collective ownership. Second, it has started very soon to disperse and, hence, has be-
come substantially dierentiated. Third, eventually it became clear that under certain
preconditions this type of ownership may be transformed more or less naturally into
ownership with considerable and even major outsider stake.
The main distinction between Russian insider ownership and a classical model of
collective ownership is the absolutely predominant role of managers in governance and
control over the Russian privatized enterprises, that are formally owned by all categories
of insiders (this issue will be thoroughly revealed in the subsequent sections of the paper).
As far as dispersion and dierentiation of insider ownership are concerned, Bim's sur-
veys showed the following facts. At the end of 1993, non-managerial employees possessed
more than 50% of shares only in 16.7% of the surveyed companies. In the prevailing num-
ber of joint-stock companies | in 66.7% of them | non-managerial employees acquired
30{50% of the shares with a good portion of the companies quite far from the upper
margin of this interval. That meant that this vast group of insiders was actually not a
core owner: without integration (getting in coalitions) with any other group of
stockholders, non-managerial employees could not establish even formal con-
trol over the stock and, therefore, over the enterprise. Given serious \positional
dierences" between managers and other employees it seemed reasonable already in 1993
(see Bim 1994a) to draw attention to the quite peculiar nature of insider ownership in
Russia and to argue against simplications such as common statements of 1993{1994 that
privatization in Russia had proceeded de facto in favor of workers (employees) or insiders
as a homogeneous group.
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At the end of 1993 the portion of managers in the structure of enterprise shareholdings
appeared to be the following: 3{5% of the shares belonged to managers in 20.8% of the
surveyed companies, 5{10% | to managers also in 20.8% of those, 10{20% of the shares
were acquired by managers in 12.5% of the companies, and 20{30% of shares belonged
to managers in 8.3% of the surveyed companies. Outsiders obtained, on average, 10{15%
of enterprise stock. In Blasi's sample (1994), top management (with no indication as to
exactly who was covered by the characteristic \top") obtained 8.6% of shares on average.
The percentage of outsiders in his sample was higher | it reached 21.5%.
In the course of 1994, according to the author's observations of the same sample, the
picture changed. At the end of 1994 and at the beginning of 1995, in more than 70% of
the companies non-managerial employees got less than 50% of the stock, and managers
obtained in about 60% of the companies 10{30% of the stock. The portion of outsiders
on average increased slightly | up to 15{18%, but in several companies outsider stake
grew up to 30% of the shares. In the much larger sample of Earle, Estrin and Leshchenko
(1995, 439 enterprises), on average across privatized companies, workers held 48% of the
shares, managers 21% and outsiders 20%.
The numbers and major outlined tendencies | (i) dierentiation of insiders and pro-
gressive increase of managers' stake and (ii) slow growth of outsider stake as well as the
appearance of a number of outsider owned enterprises | are also obvious from the sur-
veys, that were undertaken by other researchers and research teams (see Earle, Estrin and
Leshchenko 1995, for a summary).
Nevertheless, the fact of early and considerable dispersion of insider ownership among
dierent insider groups is surprisingly stressed much rarely. In our view it is quite es-
sential that, basically, workers (employees) ownership (or insider ownership in a classical
sense) in many cases appeared to be not the fact at all, and | what is more important
for our considerations now | workers themselves are possessing controlling stake rather
rarely and, therefore, are unable to control enterprises without unication with other
groups of stockholders. This trend also conrms earlier assumptions, that in the course
of privatization managers will gradually increase their shareholdings to become majority
owners (Peck 1995).
3 Major Characteristics and Strategies of
Stockholders
3.1 Managers
The crucial characteristic of the status of managers is that in the course of reforms, top
managers not only remained the key gures at the microeconomic level, as they used to
be under communism, but have signicantly strengthened their positions in almost all
respects. There are at least three reasons for that.
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First, weakness of the current statehood | certainly not in a sense of giving up cen-
tralized planning and distribution, what was natural under market transformation of the
economy, but in a sense of inconsistency and discrepancy in reformist economic policy.
Classical examples are: unpunished inter-rm arrears; federal and local subsidies, remain-
ing in hidden forms at large; various individual (per enterprise) exemptions; absence of
bankruptcies. A badly regulated economic environment gives much room both for normal,
productive managerial performance and for perversions in managerial activities.
Second, a deciency in constructive intentions and mechanisms of enterprise gover-
nance which should have been caused by privatization. What seems most important here
is the lack of appropriate control over managers.
Third, social immobility and depression of employees unable to somehow defend their
interests.
It sounds symptomatically, that none of the interviewed directors had com-
plained about the lack of self-dependence and about pressure either from the
upper or lower levels as reasons for the diculties, which managers have now
to overcome. These sorts of complaints used to be quite typical under communism.
Gurkov (1995) mentions the same: according to him, top managers are almost completely
satised by their independence in decision-making | the average estimate of respondents
was 4.55 on a 5-point scale.
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There are reasons to argue that most directors have been successfully accustomed to
transitional reforms of a la Rus type. This was forecasted in 1992 (Bim, 1994b) and has
been since then conrmed. It means that despite their often loud public claims, managers
at that time already did not rely seriously on the state as a supplier of resources in any
direct way and either free or almost free of charge. It appears to be even more important,
that directors understood that a transitional situation might promise enormous benets
to themselves; in their explicit or implicit interpretation, negative consequences of reforms
would mostly aect enterprises as such and enterprise workers (employees), while benets
ow exclusively to top managers.
This is completely relevant to privatization. Blasi (1994) and others emphasize, that
despite the evidence that insiders as a whole (and among them employees) have held a
major stake of the shares, control has concentrated around enterprise executives (general
directors or CEOs). Initial stages of Russian privatization and post-privatization devel-
opment clearly have led to managerialism (for one of the good denitions see Szelenyi,
Eyal and Townsley 1995), typical to other transition economies of Eastern Europe as well.
But the scale and signicance of this phenomenon is much more challenging in Russia.
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One of the major new dependencies (if not to say bondages) of the enterprise directors is certainly their
dependence on the maa (criminalized shadow business activities). Maa connections are usually out of
more or less exact considerations through conventional economic surveys due to the obvious impossibility
of obtaining reliable information. There are claims that the maa is rather persistent in intervening into
the Russian industrial sector in the course of privatization.
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Surveys made it clear that directors nd (or feel) certain interrelations between the
constraints of shocking, speedy economic transformation and their possibilities to fulll
individual and corporative interests. 63% expressed no doubts that gradual and \better
organized" reforms probably could soften many kinds of constraints, but would denitely
decrease individual and corporative opportunities for managers as well. This consideration
helps to interpret the unarguable fact that during the whole period of Russian reforms,
industrial managers refrained from serious attempts of putting political pressure on the
government by heating dissatisfaction and tension among workers.
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Hence, the hypothesis
can be built up, that despite the fact that many industrialists used to be and still are
in the prison of old-fashioned communist stereotypes concerning enterprise and national
economy organization, they appeared to be much closer to pro-reformist orientation than
had been often initially predicted. Nowadays the alliance of enterprise directors with any
sorts of marginals looks less and less imaginable: entrepreneural and wealth interests of
managers lie far from those of losers in the series of stormy battles for the marketization
of Russia.
It is not surprising, therefore, that politically most directors extend support to those
parties and/or public movements that do not intend to overrule the achieved results of
privatization. At the same time, directors favor politicians, who claim to soften budget
constraints, to provide or enlarge tax and duty exemptions, etc., but to the best of our
understanding they do not seriously believe that combination of such intentions with
irreversibility of privatization results is very likely. So such unrealistic claims do not seem
to be of any serious danger.
What might be much more likely and destructive, is state protectionism towards cur-
rent ownership structure, already practiced by certain federal and regional bodies and
declared by some politicians as their future goal and pre-electoral obligation. This is syn-
onymously favorable for most directors and could prevent outside investors (both domestic
and foreign) from persistent interventions into the industrial sector.
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There is a debate (see, for example, Earle, Estrin and Leshchenko 1995), whether it
makes sense to rely on self-reported perceptions of managers concerning their own role in
control over the enterprises. Certainly it would be not bad to relate those perceptions to
any kind of hard data (reports from the annual meetings of shareholders or meetings of
the boards of directors). But, rst, this is not always feasible. Second, the reliability of
hard data of this particular sort is at least to say not less questionable than the results
of in-depth interviews. In our surveys (as well as in Gurkov's) the role of managers has
4
Well-known strikes and other \protest activities" of the coal miners (Kemerovo and Vorkuta regions
mainly) are the exception. These actions often reect not only the aggressiveness of trade union leaders
and workers themselves, but the attempts of directors to gain \support from below" for their claims as
well.
5
One of the most known cases is the willingness of the regional administrative and juridical bodies of
the Krasnoyarskii kraj to reverse the results of privatization, occurred at the Krasnoyarskii aluminium
plant, in order to help the general director to get rid of outsiders, which had obtained a large stake in
this company.
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been evaluated as high by non-managerial employees, local ocials, actual and potential
outsider investors as well. In Bim's sample employees, for instance, reported that enter-
prises have been under the complete control of managers in 82% of the cases in 1993 and
in about 80% in 1994.
Top managers closely identify their individual interests with enterprises. This is not
a surprise at all: what other comparable values if not businesses being at their complete
disposal, can directors oer in \the market of opportunities" typical to the circumstances
of transition? That is why, as it was revealed in the previous section, they do their best
to make this advantageous position stronger and irreversible by concentrating enterprise
stock directly in their own hands.
Russian evidence does not corroborate the conclusion of Szelenyi, Eyal and Townsley
(1995) that conditions of economic uncertainty do produce disincentives for managers to
become private owners. This statement is fully applicable to outsiders (although many
of them are quite active in privatizing as well), but in the case of managers it seems to
be misleading. Directors already practice control over the enterprises and gain a lot from
it, so their experience of privatization is quite positive. At the same time, they do not
have any alternative sources of doing well nowadays and in future | contrary to banking
and trading entrepreneurs. So they have all the incentives to try to keep their controlling
position. But they fear outsiders, who are eager to seize control away from managers
through further stages of privatization. So they have to be aggressive in privatization in
order not to lose control. These are good reasons for directors to be willing to reinforce
actual control with genuine ownership.
Blasi (1994) presents the same conclusions. He examined opinions of the senior man-
agement of enterprises concerning future optimal ownership of their companies. It would
be strange if opinions about this subject did not implicate intentions as well. Senior man-
agers reported, that desirable ownership structure would be the following: all insiders |
72% of the stock, employees (excluding top management) | 32%, top management |
40%, all outsiders | 27%, and the state | 0%.
However, the nature and the manifestations of managers' interests towards enterprises
are not homogeneous. 1993{1994 surveys made it possible to argue for two essentially
distinctive managerial strategies (Bim, 1994a). The rst one could be called construc-
tive and means that managers try to do everything possible for the ecient adaptation
of enterprises to new circumstances. This involves (either/or) modication and mod-
ernization of production mix, substitution of suppliers and consumers by more suitable
ones, improvements of inter-rm organization, necessary cuts of personnel, restructuring
of xed assets and so forth. Approximately 26{28% of the interviewed directors were
radical enough to be considered as followers of this strategy.
The alternative strategy is naturally suggested to be called destructive. It is fol-
lowed by enterprise executives who realize that, due to quite dierent reasons, their core
businesses cannot be reliable sources of prosperity for a considerably long period of time.
Such reasons might have their roots, in particular, in the sectoral allocation of enter-
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prises. Those in the light and food processing industries, for example, are very unlikely
to promise under current conditions any wealth to entrepreneurs because of severe com-
petition of imports. So immediate eorts are made by managers not to adapt
enterprises, but rst of all to succeed in creative and intensive extraction of
incomes and enterprise capital itself for their personal benets. These eorts
sometimes may be easily dened in terms of barbarism or robbery. No less than 60%
of the interviewed directors, while discussing concrete matters of enterprise performance,
implicitly conrmed involvement in activities of this sort.
Forms of the above mentioned extraction might be various and depend on both the
creativity of managers and enterprise characteristics: prole, boundaries, technological
complexity, status of privatization (scale of outside control), etc. There are several com-
mon ways. 1993 was outstanding from the point of view of income extraction by managers
| their salaries exceeded those of workers and other non-managerial sta 5, 10 and more
times. In the surveyed sample, 38% of the top managers reported their salaries to be
higher than the enterprise average 5 and more times.
6
These gures probably were not
something outrageous in principle (the gap aggravated throughout the years and at the
beginning of 1996 reached in some cases 40 times, see Open Media Research Institute
Daily Digest No. 34, 1996-02-16), but the given Soviet tradition of equalizing incomes
they did mean rather substantial dierentiation.
Beginning with the late 80s, enterprise managers practiced largely to oer enterprise
premises (sometimes with equipment, sometimes | not) for lease. Dolgopiatova (1994)
points out that leasing used to be one of the main \survival oriented" measures in enter-
prise activities. This kind of business cannot be qualied as perversion as such. It sounds
normal in general, and in specic Russian circumstances, large-scale leasing played an
extremely positive role in the development of newly created private entities: without
renting premises from the state and former state institutions they simply could not start
and survive. But the crucial point for our consideration in the current context is, that
rent actually is utilized as the one-sided benets of general directors and their entourage.
Few investments of any sort are usually based on leasing-out premises or equipment. In
73% of the surveyed cases, non-managerial employees claimed to have earned nothing
from the rather advanced leasing-out activities of the top management. Revenues from
leasing-out premises, etc., are normally used for the all-enterprise needs in the cases of
emergency only.
Another common path, successfully followed from the late 80s, is the creation of nu-
merous semi-state or semi-private small businesses around the core ones, through which
enterprise resources are channelled to physical persons | principals of these small busi-
nesses | and then utilized by the latter with no further relation to the deals of the basic
6
It sounds interesting, that wide-spread wage arrears are in no cases applicable to enterprise managers.
While non-managerial employees may be on mandatory unpaid leave, managers continue to be paid even
if the production process is terminated, consumers do not pay, banks impose sanctions, etc.
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enterprise.
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In 100% of the cases, those principals are enterprise ocials personally or
their allies. It certainly appeared to be quite dicult to get obvious answers from the
directors on this point, but 73% of those interviewed reported to have small \surround-
ing" businesses organized under their auspices. All such businesses were evaluated by
managers as surviving, 72% of the existing number | as enlarging or gradually being
transformed into more vast private entities.
Dolgopiatova (1994) indicates more modest gures: in her sample, referring to 1993,
from one-fourth to one-third of the enterprises have practiced the organization of satellite
businesses. Szelenyi, Eyal and Townsley (1995) argue that surrounding private rms,
owned by managers (these authors call them \subcontracting', which is not exact in all
cases), are typical to privatized enterprises in Eastern Europe also.
The next form of enterprise capital extraction is strongly connected with foreign trade
transactions and related hard currency outows (quite well known as \one-way travel
of exports").
8
Middle-level ocials in 21% of the surveyed companies informally and
occasionally (while discussing other issues) reported that top management had obtained
property (real estate) abroad on behalf of the enterprises or satellite businesses. Exported
and not repatriated capital has certainly been channelled into Western nancial markets
as well.
The aforegiven statements are conformable to the results of the VCIOM nationwide
representative sample survey of 1,998 Russians, covering European and Asiatic Russia
and both urban and rural areas (Source: New Russia Barometer IV, Centre for the Study
of Public Policy, 1995). With reference to privatized enterprises, 28% of the respondents
reported that managers used rms' assets for private benets, 14% gave negative answers,
and 58% reported that it was dicult to say anything exact.
It is reasonable to mention that the described forms of so-called opportunistic behav-
ior are to a certain extent shared by all top enterprise executives, even by those who
pursue constructive strategy of management. Key orientations and scale of unfair capital
extraction are dierent, but some inherent characteristics of typical behavioral patterns
are similar. These realities characterize the major and most unpleasant feature of vague
and uncertain mixture of socio-economic interests and incentives, typical to the current
stage of socio-economic transition: superiority of individual interests over pub-
lic, corporative and other private interests reached a height, which implies
7
Beginning with 1986{1987, numerous cooperatives, joint ventures and | later on | other forms
of small businesses, eventually emerged. (See Bim, Jones and Weisskopf 1993) for quantitative charac-
teristics and description). Both logically and historically they appeared to be the predecessors of con-
temporary satellite businesses, sometimes after the transformation into more modern forms of enterprise
organization, more rarely | kept under their initial status.
8
During recent years, Russian and Western literature have been giving rather dierent evaluations of
the foreign currency outows. One of the estimations referring to 1992 and 1993 suggests, that during
each of those years hard currency outows reached 15% worth of GDP (The Jamestown Foundation
Broadcast, January Prism, Part 2, 1996-01-13). Other sources come up with the cumulative gure of
USD45 \Russian billion", kept and circulated outside the country.
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complete separation | up to opposition | of individual interests from the
interests of institutions (public, private and \mixed" structures), of which
bearers of those individual interests are members and even heads. To put it
more transparently, it means that incentives and eorts of managers, aimed at individ-
ual success and wealth are quite natural. They should be welcomed if they would not
contradict dramatically the state of a company. Unfortunately, the Russian transitional
phenomenon is completely opposite: the wealth of managers is built up not necessarily on
ecient company performance or restructuring, to the contrary | very often it is based
on purposeful and semi-legal capital extraction. That is why this phenomenon is called
\opportunistic behavior".
Estrin (1994) underlines that in circumstances where owners do not directly control
decision-making, mechanisms of governance are required to ensure that managers are
motivated to maximize prots. Now it is clear, that it is critical to stress that the talk
should be about enterprise prots, which ought to be maximized; otherwise there are
reasons to evaluate existing mechanisms of company governance in transition countries
as quite ecient since they work rather perfectly for maximizing the individual prots of
managers with no relevance to the results of companies' performance.
Peck (1995) gave a forecast that if managers become the dominant owners of en-
terprises, they would focus on prot maximization | exactly what a market system
requires. In respect to real market economies this is a truism, but in respect to transition
economies it sounds quite a bit like simplication. Russian evidence suggests that for the
time being, a minority of directors identify their own prot maximization with that of
enterprises. Therefore, it seems dicult to support the condence that all of the man-
agers, while trying to acquire a controlling stake of shares, are thinking necessarily about
companies' progress (prot maximization) and not about better conditions for themselves
as potential dominant owners for further prot and capital extraction.
From macroeconomic and institutional standpoints \managerial parasitism" can not
be considered simply as a shortcoming (see below). But the fundamental fact that
managers in charge of enterprises, which they in fact own or exercise full con-
trol over, are so far delimitating their personal interests and interests of a
company as two clear extremes, does not sound very optimistic. More observa-
tions are needed to come up with generalized conclusions on this point. But it seems to be
clear that general political and economic uncertainty, as well as peculiar cultural stereo-
types, rooting in the past, play a no less important role in the formation of managers'
strategies, than privatization as such.
Parasitism of managers, being too painful for a particular enterprise, its employees and
stockholders, might have paradoxically better implications on macroeconomic and insti-
tutional developments. In fact this is a strategy, the extreme of which leads enterprises
to inevitable bankruptcies along a probably much shorter path, than that of other poten-
tial bankrupts. This means that, from the standpoint of badly needed general structural
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adjustment, reallocation of national resources, mobility of the labor force, this strategy
could not be so disastrous.
A constructive pattern is benecial for stockholders if it means attempts of radical
restructuring. The positive potential of this strategy, however, may be undermined by a
misleading identication of an enterprise as a property object, materialized capital, and
an enterprise as a productive entity in its current shape (production mix, boundaries,
employment, etc.). Constructivism cannot mean conservation of the latter; it necessarily
means restructuring aimed at prot and/or capital maximization.
3.2 Workers (non-managerial employees)
All the interviewed managers and almost all the non-managerial employees reported the
lack of any positive inuence of privatization on incentives and behavior of workers. The
strongest \privatization interest" demonstrated in the course of 1993 was the interest in
dividends. Then, given low levels of dividends and their extremely limited availability,
employees stopped paying much attention to them.
9
Another normal interest for stockholders, such as participation in enterprise strategy
development and decision-making, according to our observations, is much weaker than is
sometimes suggested. In the shareholders' meetings the top leadership dominated com-
pletely. Evidence, that some \worker owned rms" (where the major stake remains in
the hands of employees) do exist, does not contradict this statement at all. Simply man-
agers in these particular cases either intentionally refrain from further stock acquisition
or do not have enough resources for that. At the same time, they are in full control over
companies.
If any single uctuation of workers' activeness occurs, \the activists" are usually un-
successful in seeking decisions, alternative to those suggested by management. Alliances
of non-managerial sta and outsider investors due to the initiative of the rst, which could
support stockholders-employees in attempts to override managers, are quite rare so far.
10
Employees are still more often supportive to management in the conicts \managers
vs. outsiders", because they consider even tough managers to be less radical and more
tolerant towards employees than \strangers" could potentially turn out. The idea of stock
9
The level of dividends was initially connected with the prices of shares and therefore low. Moreover, it
has been devalued continuously due to ination. Directors in all cases prefer not to pay dividends, referring
to dierent complications and to a lack of resources. At the same time, they try to pay the so-called
\13th salary", explaining to employees that for them it makes no dierence in what form | dividends
or old-timer payments | employees will receive money. In this way outsiders are certainly discriminated
against insiders and the latter, on the contrary, are appeased with the fact of this discrimination as such
and with \keeping enterprise prots from unfair distribution among strangers". If the companies are
controlled by outsiders, the dividends are certainly paid, but because of modest size still do not play the
role of \good incentive" for employees.
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Such situations still occur. One of those well announced by the mass media was the dismissal of the
old-timer general director of the Vladimirskii tractor plant and the election of a middle-aged Western
educated blockholder to this position in 1993. In Bim's sample there were 12.5% of such cases.
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concentration in the hands of managers, although not very popular among employees, is
still closer to their hearts than that concentration by outsiders. In 72% of the cases in 1993
and in 73% in 1994, responses of interviewed workers showed clearly, that managers had
succeeded in creating an \enemy image" with respect to outsider shareholders throughout
working collectives.
According to the directors' estimations, from 10{12% (1993) to 15{18% (1994) of non-
managerial employees are not interested in their position of shareholders at all. These
employees do not see advantages in holding a small part of enterprise stock or, what is
more or less the same, do not believe in the reality of any proclaimed advantages. This
group of in-house stockholders is most inclined to sell their shares | if not to say get rid
of them. They are the main suppliers of shares to both nancial markets and to eager
managers.
Gurkov and Maital (1995) also indicate some related facts. More than 40% of the
workers in their sample reported that their capacity to inuence decision-making deteri-
orated after they became shareholders, and 38% indicated \no change". 46% of workers-
shareholders even mentioned that their access to information about the performance of
their companies had also become worse after privatization. About 50% of the workers
reported playing no role in any kind of distribution including that of dividends.
It does not sound surprising then that privatization, as 100% of the directors do point
out, has not yet demonstrated any positive inuence on employees' motivations as work-
ers and specialists. Having no role as stockholders, why should they be well motivated
as enterprise functionaries? Such factors of higher motivation as the threat of layos
and wage level do matter, but rst, they are not directly connected with privatization,
and, second, are in fact beyond any real inuence of employees and sometimes even of
that of managers. Externalities like level and structure of market demand and arrears
of consumers' payments appear to be much more important factors, that determine the
economic situation at the enterprises and its impact on employees. The VCIOM survey
results oer a pessimistic estimation of current labor activities, based on responses of
workers themselves: 60% of them claim that they are \often doing little at work". Char-
acteristically, this gure is the same in reference to state and privatized enterprises. (New
Russia Barometer IV, 1995).
3.3 The State as the Enterprise Stockholder
The state bodies in charge of implementing the privatization program were initially as-
signed 20% of the enterprise shares. In some cases property funds kept up to 30% of the
shares | due to the fact, that not all of those envisioned for sale, were successfully real-
ized through primary privatization procedures (close subscription, voucher and monetary
auctions).
In principle, the state institutions are supposed to release the enterprise stock in the
course of the global process of separation of the state from the economy and depoliticiza-
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tion of enterprises. Nevertheless, there is a resistance towards complete privatization of
former state enterprises. On the one hand, such resistance comes from the state appara-
tus of dierent levels, that dreams about retaining at least some control over companies.
For a lot of remaining nomenklatura this is a question of survival.
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On the other hand,
directors, who fail to adjust enterprise performance to the marketization of the economy,
prefer to keep links with the state wishing to be supported and protected by authorities.
Both sorts of resistance determine dierent restrictions, which from time to time are put
on privatization of the state stake in enterprises of various sectors of industry.
By denition, a process of legal and administrative regulations of privatization rests
in the hands of the state. General rules and procedures were more or less set up during
1992{1995. But, as usual in Russia, implementation becomes a problem. Sometimes
diculties arise, when federal, regional or local authorities make controversial decisions
on particular points, that are based not on regulations in force, but on one-sided interests
of the parties involved in privatization. (See the footnote 5 mentioning the attempts of
restitution at the Krasnoyarskii aluminium plant). Such tendencies certainly seem quite
dangerous for continuing privatization and its impact on enterprises.
There are two main issues concerning performance of the state institutions as stock-
holders. The rst refers to their participation in the decision-making process at the pri-
vatized companies, which is important, given their possession of a large enterprise stake.
Strategy of the property funds in this respect seems to have been quite standard: in the
general meetings of the shareholders, called in order to elect the directors and executive
boards, property funds' representatives used to vote for the candidates who were sup-
ported by the majority of other voters. Another variant: if regional authorities, to which
the respective property funds are subordinated, had any preferences, representatives of
the property funds at the general meetings supported the relevant candidates. In the
board meetings enterprise executives have been usually backed by property funds. Both
enterprise managers and heads of property funds, conrmed these latter policies in the
interviews.
The second issue has been a subject for sharp debate: the continuation of the pri-
vatization process in respect to the further destiny of enterprise stock held by the state.
Already in 1994, it became more or less clear that nancial markets would not absorb
much of the enterprise stock, in particular | that which was consolidated in large pack-
ages. Demand from outsiders was not large enough. The splitting of packages, currently
held by the state, was considered by experts and policy-makers to be undesirable, due to
a likely negative impact on the prices of shares and on the creation of potentially ecient
stockholders.
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Considering the necessity to keep enterprises under control, bureaucracy has not necessarily formal
benets in mind, which it obtains from the state for doing the job. These benets could hardly be
compared with earnings in the private sector and, hence, are not very attractive. But what matters, are
the illegal relations between nomenklatura and loyal enterprise directors. Through these relationships
statesmen [may] get a lot in exchange for dierent kinds of exemptions and other forms of support.
In early 1995, a consortia of eight large Russian banks came up with an initiative to
provide the federal government with long-term loans in exchange for packages of enterprise
stock held by the state. Those packages should have been given to the banks-creditors in
trust. Such a deal seemed to be quite attractive for the government, since the 1995 state
budget had to gain 9.3 trillion rubles as revenues from this so-called \monetary stage"
of privatization, but prior to the implementation of loans-for-shares scheme only about
1.3 trillion rubles had been accumulated (Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest
I, No. 1, 1996-01-02). So there were no reasons for surprise from the rumors that this
\initiative" had been provoked by state ocials themselves.
Extensive discussions were focusing on the following issues:
(i) Do banks really have enough resources to fulll declared obligations concerning the
loans? The banking crisis, that occurred in late August 1995, heated suspicion
and uncertainty concerning the reliability and solvency of the banks. Later data
that refers to the third quarter of 1995, indicates that the net value of bank assets
decreased by 11% in comparison with the previous quarter, and growth of those
assets occurred by only 2.6%, compared with a 15.5% increase during the second
quarter. The number of commercial banks declined by 7.8% in the course of the
rst 11 months of 1995 (Open Media Research Institute Economic Digest, Vol. 2,
1996-01-04);
(ii) Will the operation planned be really helpful in creating ecient outsider holders of
enterprise stock? Or would there not be serious impact on development of fruitful
corporate governance?
For the moment these questions remain open. The process started quite recently, in
September, 1995. Nevertheless, state packages of shares of selected largest companies were
actively realized (given in trust) through competitive biddings (tenders). Among those
companies were LUKOIL, YUKOS, Nafta-Moskva (all | oil companies), and Svyazinvest
(telecommunication company). Twelve governmentally organized loans-for-shares auc-
tions took place, through which some 4.7 trillion rubles (1.01 billion USD) were generated
(Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest I, No. 1, 1996-01-02). This is 78.3% of the
total amount, gained by the government from \the monetary stage of privatization" (6
trillion rubles), and 50.5% of planned revenue, xed in the 1995 state budget.
Three main problems have become obvious in the course of this campaign:
(i) The level of demand and competition, accompanying the auctions, by now is rather
low. Typically, not more than 2{3 bidders pretend to acquire share packages being
oered. For example, at the auction, where shares of Yukos, the second largest
of Russia's oil companies were tendered, only two rival bidders showed up (Open
Media Research Institute Daily Digest I, No. 239, 1995-12-11). The same situation
occurred at the auction, organized for the release of state-owned shares of LUKOIL,
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the largest oil producer (Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest I, No. 251,
1995-12-29). The main reasons are the lack of available and \interested" domestic
capital, cautiousness of potential foreign investors and, last but not least, results
of bidding considered to be predetermined due to obvious preferences, extended by
the government to several selected banks (see more below).
(ii) As a consequence, share prices are relatively low as well. Experts claim, that oer
prices in federal loans-for-shares auctions on average are more than 30% below the
current market value for the shares of companies involved (Open Media Research
Institute Economic Digest, No. 6,7 1995-12-13). Bidding itself often appears to be
quite symbolic: the consortium of the LUKOIL company and the Imperial Bank won
the bid, oering to the government USD35.1 million for a package of LUKOIL shares
with the starting price of USD35 million (The Jamestown Foundation Broadcast, 8
December 1995, Monitor).
(iii) The government is dealing with a limited number of banks (about 2% of the total
number), which looks as they are enjoying serious advantages. It is amazing, that
the winners in the tenders are typically those bidders, who have aliation with
the banks, authorized to organize these very tenders. For example, Menatep bank
acquired 78% of the YUKOS shares through an intermediary company Laguna. A
33% stake was purchased at the investment auction for USD150 million, guaranteed
by Menatep, and a 45% stake in the loans-for-shares auction. USD159 million
credit in the last case was guaranteed jointly by Menatep, Tokobank and Stolichnyi
bank. The only rival bidder, admitted to the loans-for-shares auction, was Reagent,
another company sponsored by this very bank. Menatep was also the organizer of
the auction (on behalf of federal authorities). (Open Media Research Institute Daily
Digest I, No. 239, 1995-12-11). Now Menatep has to invest USD350 million only
in YUKOS (op. cit.), having a lot of other loan and investment obligations (Open
Media Research Institute Daily Digest I, No. 231, 1995-11-29).
The indicated problems cause a lot of concern and, as already mentioned, leave the
issue of eciency of loans-for-shares schemes quite open at the moment.
3.4 Outsider Investors
There are three categories of outsider investors, which have dierent nature (origins) and
demonstrate dierent intentions and activities from the standpoint of further privatization
and impact on the enterprises.
3.4.1 Private companies
These (including sometimes former state enterprises) are most active in nancial markets.
They intentionally acquire shares in order to obtain either control or at least inuence over
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enterprise deals. So their inclination to intervene in decision-making may be regarded as
obvious. The surveys, conducted by the author, did not address this kind of shareholders
specically, but occasional information suggested that often private entities, intending to
obtain real inuence or control over a particular enterprise or group of enterprises, come
up with quite substantial restructuring programs. The problem is, that there are still
too few cases where outsiders manage to acquire either a controlling stock or at least a
controlling position.
Actually, two kinds of enterprises have to be delimitated. First, companies, in the
capital of which outsiders do not obtain controlling or sizable stake. So far, these form
the majority of former state enterprises. The participation of private companies in the
performance of such enterprises remains on average not signicant. It would be strange
to accuse them for precautions: what sense does it make to intervene with private money
in the deals, that are not under control from the side of investors? Unless the patterns
of control would not change due to either the enlargement of outsiders' stake, or to the
emergence of any other forms of strengthening outsiders' decision-making and controlling
power (let us say, the banks will inevitably put real sanctions against debtors that may
bring them to bankruptcy and then eventually in the hands of outsiders), the activity of
private investors will stay limited and even shrinking.
Second, enterprises, being owned and therefore controlled by outsiders. These are a
minority so far, and owners demonstrate controversial behavior. In Bim's sample, only
several companies were owned by outsiders, and in all of the observed cases the new
owners implemented substantial restructuring projects based on funding brought in by
themselves. Opposite examples are also not a revelation. Therefore, Gurkov's (1995)
view on outsiders' characteristics makes a lot of sense. His conclusion is, that private
companies are rather active in penetrating into the industrial sector (which probably
reects more 1994{1995 tendencies, than 1993{1994). At the same time, these eagerly
expected core owners \act mostly as company raiders", preferring either to dissolve newly-
owned enterprises immediately, or to use them as \cash cows" for their own current needs.
The lack of strategic agenda in relation to outsiders is seriously stressed by this author,
as well as by Earle, Estrin and Leshchenko (1995).
3.4.2 Voucher investment funds (\CHIFs")
These funds were established mainly by banks and other nancial structures on the eve
of privatization and were supposed to serve as intermediaries in vouchers' (\privatization
checks") and shares' circulation. As Estrin (1994) and Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994)
point out, such intermediaries were suggested especially in order to confront and over-
come the wide diusion of property rights, materialized in initial privatization certicates
(vouchers). Following this logic, these funds had to play the role of major corporate
outsider owners. These intentions certainly caused opposition towards intermediary in-
stitutions from the side of enterprise managers, and as a reection legal restrictions were
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set up, according to which voucher funds were not permitted to possess more than 10%
of the stock of a particular enterprise.
As a result \CHIFs" have appeared to be one of the \modest" and inecient stock-
holders. In Bim's sample (if referring to 1994), in 21% of the enterprises \CHIFs" were
holding 10{12% of the shares (later on the above mentioned restrictions were waived), in
23% of the companies | 5{10% of the shares. Pistor (1994), indicates that the average
stake held by a voucher fund in her sample (148 of the total of 516 of these funds in Russia)
was about 7.6%. Few exceptions known from the media and other sources only conrm
the rule, as usual. Moreover, after gaining huge prots on voucher speculations, voucher
funds had tried to extrapolate the same \speculative strategy" on their deals with enter-
prise shares. So their interests were manifested mainly in the area of nancial markets
as such with no particular focus on enterprise control, management and/or restructuring.
Many of these investors have become insolvent and eventually gone bankrupt; some have
been transformed into conventional nancial markets' players.
3.4.3 \Physical persons"
There are reasons to subdivide physical persons-outsiders into two groups. The rst
group is not very large and consists of \free riders", who acquire quite small packages
of enterprise shares in order to get dividends and/or to speculate in the markets. This
group is not interested in enterprise performance and perspectives at all (i.e., interests are
limited by the current sights of getting dividends). The second group is more exciting. It
consists of people, who formally have nothing to do with the enterprises in question (in
the sense that they are not employees), but at the same time are in close contact with: (i)
either top managers or managerial coalitions, which control the enterprise or are seeking
complete control; (ii) or private entities interested in the same. In both cases interests
and strategies of this type of shareholders are strictly dependent on the strategies of their
shadow seniors.
Pistor's (1994) observation, that most of the trading of stocks (88.6%) takes place
o the ocial markets helps to imagine, how such peculiar shareholders appear on the
scene (or better, act behind the scene). It also shows that enterprise managers are in
fact controlling not only enterprises as such, but outside share circulation (i.e., nancial
markets) as well.
4 Ownership and Control: Reection of Late Soviet
Stereotypes or Move to Corporate Governance?
The fact that ownership and control cannot coincide to a complete extent had been well
known and broadly discussed in Western literature far earlier than privatization in Eastern
Europe appeared on the agenda. Therefore, the issue that privatization procedures should
have been aimed at the creation of ecient corporate governance system, which would
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be able to provide more or less appropriate control by owners over managers and assure
positive motivations of the latter, was challenged often on the eve of privatization in
transition economies. See, for example, Estrin (1994), Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994).
4.1 Control versus Ownership: Russian Peculiarities
This problem has to be considered as particularly important for Russia. The point is, that
the former administrative system eventually produced and xed extremely untransparent
and unclear relations of management and decision-making concerning so-called public
property. Enterprises and other entities, having been proclaimed as public or even \nation-
wide", were never really treated as such by the ruling bureaucracy. Moreover, within
bureaucracy, delimitation of rights and functions used to be quite vague and uncertain.
Existing hierarchies relied extensively on both formal and informal relations between
ocials (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1995). Although legal and administrative procedures
existed, that were supposed to balance public, regional, local and individual interests, in
fact the bulk of power was concentrated in the upper levels of state and communist party
hierarchy. Major issues of enterprise performance, such as prole and production mix,
main suppliers and customers, rules of income distribution and capitalization, price and
wages regulations, etc., were strictly predetermined by the central governmental bodies.
At the same time, the center was seriously dependent on the enterprise administration
in the process of working out plans and regulations and in the course of fullling plans as
well. In the rst case, information from below was necessary, in the second, certain eorts
were inevitable \beyond the regulations" in order to meet usually not very realistic tasks.
Given the scale of the economy and size of the country, the center was doomed to relying
on managers from lower levels, rst of all | enterprise executives. The latter not only
enjoyed a lot of privileges, granted to Soviet nomenklatura, but also created a complicated
system of levers for the reinforcement of their real (both formal and informal) positions
in decision-making. One of the most common levers was multiphasic bargaining for lower
plans in return for higher supplies (see for description Bim (1989) and Naishul' (1991).
It is necessary to mention that some pseudo-democratic procedures used to be a part
of the Soviet planning. General meetings of \working collectives" for the endorsement
of dierent \counter plans" as well as innovative initiatives (very often | after prior
approval of such \initiatives" by the upper levels), local trade unions committees, \rec-
ommending" on wages and social benets, were quite common in this really whimsical
system of management and decision-making. So many employees recognized such proce-
dures as meetings of the shareholders as similar kinds of pro forma well known from the
past.
It makes sense to stress, that in all these articial mechanisms of management enter-
prise directors played a key role. In the course of the 70s they became quite qualied in
pursuing decisions (or, what was the same, drafts and proposals for decisions of the upper
levels), clearly identied with their own interests. Under those circumstances, however,
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the interests of managers could not be separated too much from those of the enterprises.
The further promotion of managers and their material wealth used to be dependent on suc-
cess (which was actually also a subject for denition! | A.B.) of enterprise performance.
The easiest and most common way to achieve higher results was certainly to diminish the
goals as well as real production capacities. So both managers' and enterprises' interests
were aimed at making life easier | fullling lower plans with larger centrally allocated
resources.
The challenging feature of \communist management" was the following: depending on
the concrete situation, both upper bureaucracy and enterprise employees could be success-
fully misled by managers. Employees were completely under the inuence of enterprise
executives.
These facts from the past are mentioned in this far from historical paper in order to
arrive at the following: privatization procedures, as they were built up and implemented in
Russia, could not rapidly change the psychology, mental outlook and behavioral habits of
enterprise insiders. This means that the ruling, superior position of enterprise managers
appeared to be a priori given obstacle for any sucient corporate governance at the
Russian formerly state enterprises.
Hence, in all cases of the acquisition of the major part of enterprise stock by insiders,
the full control over the enterprises certainly belongs to managers, and more concretely,
to general directors. That explains a gap between the formal assignment of shares and
the real control exercised by the shareholders. Real control is in the hands of managers.
The aforementioned statements are hardly new to experts dealing with economies of
the Soviet and post-Soviet type. They are articulated here, because sometimes analysts
do not question the adequateness of the real process of control and governance to formal
ownership structure. Russian privatized enterprises can be certainly classied according
to the structure of shareholdings. But in our view, there is no straight dependence until
now between the surface of a picture (structure of shareholdings within insider ownership)
and the substance, i.e., shape of real power or control. In-depth interviews clearly show,
that even if the majority of enterprise stock is in the hands of non-managerial employees,
managers are the only real controlling party. Other insiders simply do not have enough
access to working out, considering, formulating, approving and implementing decisions
if this is not done through managers. But if it is so, the latter certainly have all the
opportunities to pursue those policies, which they themselves evaluate as appropriate,
despite \the formalities" of ownership structure.
These statements are completely consistent with some conclusions of Earle, Estrin
and Leshchenko (1995); for example with their statement that the balance of advantage
between managerially-owned and worker-owned rms in terms of inuence on enterprise
behavior is unclear. Our explanation is that both types of companies are controlled by
managers and, therefore, do not show many dierences in performance. The same reason
interprets another conclusion of these authors, that the eects of \worker ownership" on
behavior and restructuring are not yet as disastrous as predicted.
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There are even reasons to argue, that when employees reach the top of their inuence
on the enterprise deals and change (re-elect) the general directors at the general meetings
of shareholders, they do not end up with establishing any real control over newly elected
directors. In 18% of the surveyed enterprises late directors did not receive their mandates
for the next term during 1993{1994. Both employees and new directors claimed, that
the former managers were dismissed due to the lack of competence, mismanagement, etc.
But then 92% of the employees emphasized that the new directors did not introduce
any radical changes, relevant to the reasons of the dismissal of former leaders, and were
not more responsible to workers than the previous ones. 88% of newly elected directors
reported that they do not nd any sense or possibility to manage the enterprises meeting
those demands of the collectives, for ignoring which the former leaders became red. The
situation described certainly may reect the fact, that some general directors are actually
dismissed not due to mismanagement in a common sense, but either because of causes
being quite beyond their inuence, or because of internal conicts they did not succeed
to ward o or overcome.
The above mentioned statements do not mean that things are more straightforward
than they really are. Employees certainly have some inuence on management. The
variety of precise circumstances force enterprise executives to consider workers' reactions
on forthcoming decisions or foreseeable events. Such considerations may be dependent
also on the ownership structure, among other factors. Interviews denitely prove that
directors prefer to act in order to eliminate or unblock potential or actual conicts much
more than to provoke them. But this kind of indirect inuence, which is actually not
too strong, diers from that which might be a direct one, predetermined by the active
role of holders of a major part of enterprise stock. Such role could be played only in
the case of self-identication of employees as proprietors, on the basis of their vested
interests, well-targeted strategies and perfect organization. That would mean real impact
of privatization on decision-making and management.
4.2 Managerialism in Russia: Key Features and Key Problems
Directors are certainly thinking about making their actual control over enterprises more
solid and prolonged. That it is why they are working on the transformation of control,
based on traditions and administrative advantages, into control, based on adequate own-
ership structure. So there are reasons to emphasize, that the substance of a running
process from the side of managers is not gaining control due to the sizable
stake of property acquired, but to acquire a sizable property stake in order
to keep and strengthen the control already achieved and exercised. This is a
serious dierence between the position of managers and that of outsiders. Control serves
as a precondition for ownership, not vice versa. And ownership is still not necessarily a
precondition for control.
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87% of the directors, 73% (1993) and 77% (1994) of other managers reported that
they have had denite interest in the further acquisition of enterprise stock. This is
not a surprise, given the evidence of the concentration of shares in their hands (see the
rst section). It might sound interesting, that there are two ways of that concentration:
an \open" and a \hidden" | a very typical Russian combination. The \open" way
includes the following activities: (i) implementation of dierential conditions for closed
subscription for shares under the second privatization option, which provided preferential
opportunities for managers. This mechanism has been used by 25% of the surveyed
enterprises; (ii) intensive buy-out of shares at the rst voucher and monetary auctions.
Prior mobilization of vouchers and funds was necessary for that; it had been successfully
completed by top managers on the basis of their personal benets, gained from the phases
of initial liberalization of the Soviet economy (1988{1991) and well known spontaneous
or nomenklatura privatization (in more or less the same period); (iii) even more intensive
buy-out of shares in the secondary market | primarily from the voucher funds, as well as
from the employees-shareholders. The latter are commonly forced to sell out shares within
the working collective, i.e., to managers, even in cases of open joint stock companies, where
such order is not predetermined legally as an exclusive one.
The \hidden" way, used by directors or managers' coalitions, implies : (i) mobilization
of existing satellite private structures (see section 2.1.) or creation of new ones, especially
for the concentration of shares according to guidelines of enterprise executives; (ii) ori-
entation of private persons formally having no relations with the enterprise, but having
those with its leadership, on purchasing shares in the auctions and secondary market.
Not only the \hidden", but also the \open" ways described, were certainly not eagerly
revealed by managers in the course of the interviews. It does not seem possible to present
any more or less reliable quantities, characterizing scale of these operations. But quite
reliable information can be extracted by analyzing the Registers of shareholders. Many
curiosities become obvious if one examines those (not to mention that their availability not
only for strangers, but also for \ordinary" shareholders themselves is usually in question,
and our sample was not an exception in most of the cases). For example, in 67% of the
surveyed joint-stock companies, the list of outside stockholders consisted up to 10{22% of
legal entities, which were registered at the same mailing addresses as the basic enterprises.
Could better proof be found, that those entities were nothing else but satellite structures
under the control of enterprise leadership? Moreover, in 58% of the surveyed enterprises
among physical persons-outsiders percentage of people, identied in the Registers by the
same family names as those of enterprise top executives, varied from 3 to 19%.
There are no reasons to argue that aggressiveness of managers as new owners is in
all cases dangerous. There were many claims in professional literature and in the media
that managers will necessarily demonstrate old-style stereotypes as lacking competence,
conservatism, rent-seeking from the state, excessive care of employees, and so forth. To
a certain extent it has obviously appeared to be true. But at the same time, rather
many managers have performed in a very exible and pro-reformist way, and the speed of
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their adaptation to the new environment has been really amazing. Under such leadership
dozens, if not hundreds, of Russian enterprises are already recovering. At some point many
directors adapted too rapidly and too radically, given their intentions of clear separation of
their individual business interests from those of enterprises for which they were in charge.
We tried \to measure" business qualities of enterprise directors, analyzing their be-
havior in the spheres of production, marketing, investments and restructuring, nancial
policy, labor policy, and privatization. It is necessary to stress, that not only facts of
enterprise performance were taken into account, but those facts in connection with direc-
tors' activities. This way was chosen due to the obvious assumption that success stories
and enterprise performance in general are dependent both on subjective factors, such as
directors' policies, and (sometimes much more) on objective factors (sectoral allocation,
technological level achieved, etc.) and, let us say, external conditions (regional allocation,
remoteness from sources of energy and transport).
33% of the directors in 1993 and 38% in 1994 could be considered quite competent and
ecient: they managed to maintain a more or less stable nancial status of enterprises;
sucient changes in production mix were timely introduced; destructive social conicts
were avoided; and purposeful privatization policy, including admission of outside investors,
was pursued.
25% of the directors in 1993 and 27% in 1994 could be evaluated as more or less
corresponding to pro-reformist demands: they achieved an acceptable level of current
functioning, rst of all due to ecient commercial policy, including judicious price for-
mation and exibility towards suppliers and consumers; restructuring was going on, but
without the introduction of all the potentially possible levers and sources; moderate pa-
ternalism used to be practiced; privatization was going ahead, but purposefulness and a
strategic approach were lacking.
Finally, 42% of the enterprise executives in 1993 and 35% of those in 1994 seemed to
be unable to lead their companies to recovery and market adaptation: the nancial status
was continuously critical; almost no restructuring took place, also in a sense of changes
in the output structure; stock was spontaneously diusing without any evidence of goals
from the side of enterprise management.
So from the point of current activities, there are probably not so many reasons to
dream about immediate removal of directors{old-timers.
Szelenyi, Eyal and Townsley (1995) consider, that the dominant ideology of manage-
rialism is monetarism| \if for the new New Class, what Marxism-Leninism, or scientic
socialism was for the old New Class". If it is supposed by the authors that monetarism is a
goal or strategy of making money, this is certainly true. Then it is questionable, however,
whether scientic socialism was really the practical ideology in the past, because people
were concerned about making money under communismas well. But if monetarism should
be interpreted in a more classical sense (hard nancial constraints, minimal interference
of the state in the enterprise performance, managerial behavior meeting these conditions
adequately), then our surveys do not conrm this observation, although it may sound very
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attractive for liberals. It remains a question, if even outside the industrial sector, within
the segments of economy, occupied by newly created private entities, this statement is
true. Concerning managers of former state and now privatized enterprises, they are rather
homogeneous as a whole; despite some dierences, they seem to be followers of only one
ideology | pragmatism. Identication of their personal interests and thorough following
of those interests in practical life form the background of their behavior.
Basically, those directors, who do not meet \the demands of time", eventually go.
According to some estimations, that are worth verifying, 20{30% of the general directors
achieved their current positions in 1992{1995.
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What is really crucial, refers more to
their status as proprietors. As such they typically demonstrate a strong unwillingness to
share their control over enterprises with any outsiders, who are not under their control
themselves. This is characteristical to this \social corporation", and very often the
more progressive and ecient particular directors are in current performance,
the less they are committed to any losses of control. It seems a bit too optimistic
to suggest, that if enterprise shares are mainly bought by managers, there are no reasons
for the latter not to behave in the interests of other outsiders (Sutela, 1995). Such reasons
exist and are rooted partly in psychology, partly in the above mentioned possibilities for
the directors to benet more through unfair all-embracing control than through civilized
corporate governance.
At least two problems arise here. First, as is well known both from theory and practice
of corporate governance, lack of outside control is quite bad by denition. Economic agents
are unlikely to work eciently in the long run, being governed in authoritarian style, i.e.,
without the inuence of concerned and responsible proprietors on administrators. Second
and most important: in the contemporary transition economies privatized property and
mobile capital are separated and concentrated in dierent institutional forms. Property
| in the industrial sector, mobile (or nancial) capital | in the banks and other nancial
institutions. In order to achieve necessary industrial restructuring of enormous scale, it is
inevitable to bring these two components of economic resources together. The challenge
is, that this looks completely impossible if nancial structures do not channel nancial
ows into the production sphere, and they will certainly not do it unless the current
controllers are ready to exchange control for such inows.
So more or less normal corporate governance becomes crucial not only because of
inherent problems and goals of privatization. It becomes crucial due to the lack (if not to
say, absence) of resources at the disposal of enterprises for substantial market adaptation
12
It is interesting to mention, that new CEOs are typically recruited by those parties, which manage
to obtain control over the enterprises and get rid of the former directors, from among the second-third
persons of the \relative companies" (with the same prole, similar technology, etc.). \Pure strangers"
are put into this position quite rarely. Following this strategy, the new owners, rst, demonstrate their
care about professional skills of the appointees. Another reason not to recruit general managers from
outsiders is the unwillingness of the owners to enlarge the power of only one of themselves; this refers to
the situations, in which outsider ownership and control rest in the hands of several proprietors (persons
or parties).
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and restructuring. That is why specic attention is paid by analysts and policy-makers
to the current, monetary stage of privatization and to described loans-for-shares schemes,
aimed at obtaining by the banks (through their subsidiaries) a sizable component of the
enterprise stock. But in return banks are going to credit government, not enterprises. So
direct monetary inows to the latter, although envisioned in the course of this maneuver,
may be regarded as questionable.
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Time will show also, what this kind of trust (state-
owned packages are supposed to be given to the banks in trust) means for both corporate
governance and the further destiny of stock | which banks probably would intend to sell
further on in order not only to have their money, lend to the government, back, but to
end up with a good surplus.
4.3 Coalitions of Managers and Privatization. Erosion of the
Former Basic Social Contract
Surveys done by the author, clearly demonstrated evidence of wide-spread in-enterprise
managerial coalitions (Bim, 1994a), eciently created and functioning in order to exer-
cise control over current enterprise activities and benet from them even if particular
enterprises are in deep and continuous nancial diculties. This is the best proof that
patterns of control do not necessarily depend either on ownership structure or, what
may seem even more surprising, on the nancial status of the enterprises. Such in-house
managers' coalitions are used very broadly for the successful acquisition of shares and,
hence, for privatization of enterprises not only de facto, but also de jure in favor of general
directors and their allies.
Gurkov's (1995) assumption is that coalitions (he calls them \alliances") are usually
created by those directors, who lack the nancial and organizational means to acquire
shares immediately themselves. Our observations are a bit dierent: coalitions are ini-
tiated by directors almost in all cases, irrespective of their possibilities to build up a
single-person ownership. There are at least three reasons for that: (i) directors make
other managers more interested in proper enterprise performance and more responsible
for the results. There are almost no real possibilities to exercise ecient administrative
control, for which the formal rights of directors is only one of the necessary preconditions,
so the issue of economic incentives sounds quite crucial; (ii) by involving managers into
in-house coalitions, directors try to avoid attractiveness for them of other alliances, rst
of all of alliance with aggressive outsiders; (iii) managerial coalitions make all the man-
agers feel themselves to be \natural partners" of directors in all cases of potential and
real confrontations within the working collectives. The importance of the last two points
may be conrmed by the fact, that in all the known cases of overthrowing the enterprise
directors, the latter somehow lost support from the side of middle-level management.
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In most cases, direct monetary inows are envisioned. In our view, it is still questionable, whether
or not they will occur in reality. There are already examples, that investors postpone nancing, which
used to be a condition under competitive bidding, after obtaining a desirable block of shares.
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It seems appropriate to mention here, that managers' coalitions are completely dif-
ferent from the well-known and much less formal social contracts between managers
and employees, typical to the Soviet era. Peck (1995) supposes, that there are coalitions
between managers and the workers' collectives, which the present pattern of enterprise
control is still based upon. Not arguing against certain obvious commonalities in interests
of all insiders, we defend a completely dierent approach. Due to the disappearance of
all-covering state control (late 80s | early 90s) and privatization (1992{1995) in Russia,
dierences in the interests of \positionally strong insiders" (managers) and \positionally
weak insiders" (workers or other employees) have become muchmore signicant than their
commonalities. That is why contemporary managers' coalitions have nothing to
do with the unication of those groups of insiders. To the contrary, they reect
contradictions in interests and patterns of behavior of former social partners, now almost
antagonists. Uvalic (1995), on the basis of analysis of privatization in the countries of
Eastern and Central Europe, also points out that it is necessary to distinguish managers
and employees as quite dierent categories of insiders.
One issue has to be especially examined in the context of erosion of the former basic
social contract between managers and employees. Dolgopiatova (1994) and many others
emphasize, that managers typically feel certain obligations concerning employees, origi-
nated in habitual values of the communist past. These obligations refer, rst of all, to
\safekeeping of the working collective" (refraining from ring employees due to economic
necessities) and maintaining a more or less appropriate (socially acceptable) salary level.
Dolgopiatova points out, that in her sample among the main goals of enterprises, as seen
by general directors, 58% of the latter put in the rst place \safekeeping of the working
collective".
Bim's sample, however, suggested dierent observations. Only 33% of the directors
reported that they would give priority to the above mentioned goals; 20.8% did not
mention social problems by their own initiative at all and, answering precise questions,
explicitly underlined that they would not consider these problems, rst of all preservation
of employment, to be important goals for enterprises in transition.
In-depth interviews demonstrate, that a pragmatic approach in the attitude of man-
agers towards employees is much more prevailing than emotional or ideological ones.
Directors would prefer to avoid any more or less large-scale conicts | that is the crite-
ria they really follow, which has nothing to do with any curtsies towards values, moral
obligations, etc. Most of the concrete solutions are made on the basis of a pure pragmatic
approach.
With respect to wages, managers try to maintain a certain salary level, compatible
with the in-regional standards. First of all, this level follows the ination and, typically,
is almost not connected with particular labor achievements and with economic reasons
relevant to the enterprise as a whole. Dolgopiatova (1994) mentions, that wages have
been transformed into an \independent component" of production costs. In many cases
salary increases eat up a substantial portion of cumulative enterprise earnings. At the
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same time, a majority of directors channel some current resources for purchasing new
equipment, i.e., for a kind of renovation and even restructuring (changing of production
mix). In Bim's sample, about 18% of the directors in 1993 and 27% of those in 1994
reported buying equipment for production purposes.
As far as employment is concerned, estimations according to International Labor Or-
ganization criteria, show that 6 million Russians | 8.2% of the potentially working pop-
ulation | are unemployed (Open Media Research Institute Economic Digest, No. 8,
1996-01-03). Hidden unemployment (people are kept aliated with the job, but in reality
not working regularly or full time due to the lack of resources, necessary for reproduction)
covers much more people. So it is obvious that personnel, in fact, is cut, despite any dec-
larations, but in order to keep people quiet and to save some labor reserve for potential
(in many cases | wishable) \production boom", personnel reductions are adjusted and
moderate.
The conclusion is, that managers' declarations concerning their \social orientations"
should not be taken too seriously. Real facts suggest the pragmatic approach is followed
much more often.
Coalitions of the revealed type do not leave any room for non-managerial employees
to withstand the dictatorship of managers in governance and their expansion in privati-
zation. There is simply nobody who could organize and lead any resistance. Directors
conrmed, that they attentively follow the situation and either expel dissatised employ-
ees, or involve them in coalitions with all the consequences concerning benets in general
and privatization advantages in particular.
Gurkov (1995) and Gurkov and Maital (1995) underline, that the role of middle-level
managers has become, in their own view, considerably less important in the process of
decision-making. This shows that these managers actually have accepted a subordinate
role in the coalitions oered by top managers. We have monitored quite a few cases,
where middle-level managers responded dierently, evaluating their inuence as much
higher than it used to be before. It may easily be so. Inherently predetermined monocen-
tric decision-making (for example, until now everything might have become operational at
the enterprises only through written orders, signed by the general directors personally),
allows the enlargement of competence of the lower levels. But with one quite neces-
sary precondition: such enlargement can be legally and technically achieved only on the
grounds of acceptance by a general director, who is granting new functions and rights to
the enterprise employees, subordinated to him. So the exceptions that we have observed,
sound unarguable in a context of delegation of competence from the top of managerial
vertical to its bottom. But it does not mean any aggravation of the self-contained role of
middle-level managers in a framework of privatization, corporate governance and enter-
prise control.
Top management and, rst of all general directors (chief executive ocers), of enter-
prises play a dominant role in the coalitions not spontaneously, but quite consciously.
The ndings of Blasi (1994) conrm, that the design of coalitions themselves is a subject
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for thorough consideration of the general directors. On his question about desirable dis-
tribution of insider ownership in future \optimal" ownership structure, CEOs responded,
that within 40% of the stock, they would prefer to be allocated to top management, 31%
should be posessed by themselves and 9% | by other top managers. In addition, 17% of
the stock should be given to other (lower-ranked) managers.
Besides the aforementioned in-house coalitions, there appear to exist two more of a
traditional type and decreasing inuence. First, the coalition of managers, dealing with
technologically and economically related enterpises of former branches or sub-branches
(sectors or sub-sectors) of the economy. Second, the coalition of those managers, who are
governing technologically and/or formerly organizationally integrated enerprises within
regions. Such coalitions are typically not forming for privatization needs: they embody
quite dierent forms of managerial cooperation, beginning with searching for suppliers
and customers and nishing with lobbying in political circles and seeking investors. Our
observation is, that most of the directors currently do not need these forms of \mild
integration" too much and gradually give up membership in them.
Dolgopiatova (1994) describes in detail existing vertical and horizontal associations
(\objedineniya"), which may serve as examples of coalitions of a traditional type. Ac-
cording to her data, in the fall of 1993 43% of the enterprises reported their unwillingness
to join associations, 40% of privatized enterprises ceased to be members in any of them.
Ickes, Ryterman and Tenev (1995) thoroughly explore the inuence of membership in
such associations on enterprise restructuring.
Another type of external (or outside) coalition deserves serious further attention.
These coalitions are emerging on the basis of mutual exchange and penetration of stocks
between technologically and/or economically related companies. This process is organized
by interested directors. Surveys produce many examples of directors trying to manage the
dissemination of shares not only inside, but also outside the working collectives. In 1993
they were most active with such initiatives, because during that very year outside circu-
lation of shares was broadly launched by voucher and rst monetary auctions. Therefore,
initial aliation of large outside blocks could, to a certain extent, determine further de-
velopment of privatization and control over the enterprises. In Bim's sample, 62.5% of the
directors reported implementing purposeful policies in order to attract suitable outsiders
by providing the latter with information about envisioned auctions and, what is even
more expressive, by propaganda (so to say, very active advertising) of their companies as
perfect objects for capital intervention.
In most cases coalitions of this type were organized certainly in order to prevent inter-
vention of unexpected and \dangerous" outsiders. In other words, \loyal outsiders"
were created on the initiative of directors. There were three typical paths for this
process: \loyal outsiders" were selected (i) among more or less stable and reliable suppli-
ers and consumers; (ii) within the economic sector, to which the enterprise-initiator itself
belonged; (iii) by mutually advantageous agreements with new private (originally private,
not privatized) investment institutions. In the rst case, directors considered that they
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had surrounded themselves with commercial partners, who should be naturally interested
in the stable functioning of their company. In the second case, experience and well estab-
lished connections within former industrial branches or associations of a traditional type
were intended to be exploited. The third path promised certain nancial support. But
the main, usual goal was to prevent stocks from being spontaneously circulated in the
nancial markets without the control and inuence of managers.
Coalitions of this sort (contrary to the above mentioned traditional associations) can
be assessed as the product of the privatization process and indicate the emergence of
a signicant stage of it, theoretically able to break (to change) the existing enterprise
structures and boundaries and to lead to the formation of new market entities. But for
this purpose the incentives of directors have to change quite a bit: they have to move
from safe-guarding, protective aspirations to active entrepreneural motivations, implying
interests in stock concentration and expansion of ownership and control not only inside,
but primarily outside their basic companies. This was not the case in 1993{1995. So
for now coalitions described are used much more not for the development of new market
institutions, but to the contrary, for the conservation of old structures, i.e., for the purpose
they were originally invented.
4.4 Outsiders as Actual and Potential Core Owners
When discussing the issues of corporate governance, it probably makes sense to men-
tion, that while obtaining a major or controlling stake of the capital, outsiders do not
necessarily demonstrate the expected inclinations to invest largely and to improve the
enterprise performance immediately. Their practices of control over managers are often
quite controversial. We have already cited Gurkov (1995) on this point (section 2.4.); a
more milder conclusion of the same sort is suggested by Earle, Estrin and Leshchenko
(1995). So a certain contradiction between theory (or expectations) and reality is taking
place.
The reasons for the likely ineciency of outsider ownership in Russia are to a great
extent rooted in the nature of rather many outsiders.
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This time we do not mean CHIFs
or individuals, but domestic and even foreign banks, investment companies and whatever.
Some of them perform quite normally, some | with serious deviations and perversions.
It is beyond our goals to explore this subject now, and the evidence is limited by only
a few examples of outsider ownership, but certain considerations and forecasts (if not to
say alarms) sound rather urgent.
Many of the domestic investors originated in the Soviet or post-Soviet shadow econ-
omy and almost all of them have been functioning during recent years under the inuence
of hidden \maosi" structures. This causes a lot of contamination to behavioral stereo-
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Such reasons as political uncertainty and maosnost, pure economic considerations concerning exces-
sive taxes, lack of legal basis for prot sharing, enormous transportation costs, etc., matter certainly as
well.
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types and business habits of new and relatively new private structures (even if they are
only partly contaminated yet). Foreign investors, who are active in Russia, very often
represent not the best Western companies. Along with good names there are a lot of
marginal companies, sometimes based on activities of former exiles, sometimes | on
partial repatriation of illegally exported or not properly returned domestic capital.
Hypothetical reservations about outsiders (as well as much more obvious facts and
statements concerning insiders) should not be taken into account for straightforward re-
visions of current privatization activities, nor for any forms of illegal and dishonest resti-
tution in cases already done. There are no reasons for attempts to diminish the necessity
of corporate governance as a mechanism for establishing and maintaining satisfactory re-
lations between proprietors and managers as well. The point is, however, that the
destiny of the enterprise performance in Russia for the time being is proba-
bly not synonymously predetermined by the prevalence of insider or outsider
ownership and control. In the short run, most likely it will be dependent
on the shape and intentions of concrete actors | insiders and outsiders |
dealing with particular enterprises in the course of privatization and post-
privatization. Perotti (1994) seems to be quite realistic, suggesting that the role of
individuals, running and controlling enterprises, will continue to be quite high. Current
Russian realities require some clarication: the role of individuals will be high regardless
of their being either managers or outsiders. That means, inter alia, the necessity to take
into account a variety of multiple and controversial components, that determine and in-
uence individual behavior and are much beyond schemes and factors of privatization as
such.
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4.5 Challenging Issues of Corporate Governance in Question
The concrete situation in Russia makes theoretical discussions concerning dierent vari-
ants for ecient corporate governance almost senseless (see, for example, Perotti (1994)
for a summary of those variants). Alternatives like nancial intermediaries vs. banks or
capital markets vs. specially created \holding companies as privatization agencies" (op.
cit.) are not precise enough. Assuming that somehow industrial capital will become avail-
able for penetration by monetary inows from the nancial sector (what is not obvious at
the moment at all), the key very pragmatic issue is, what actual and potential economic
actors do have enough interest and resources for essential intervention into the industrial
sector? How much are they ready to invest in order to obtain control over the former
state capital, a good part of which is so far without a core owner?
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The fact, that transition in Russia, CIS and Eastern Europe is of a systemic nature is not completely
understood yet, so to say, on the instrumental level. The systemic approach is not realized practi-
cally, while concrete economic issues are analyzed. Privatization is one of those issues, that badly need,
along with analysis of economic factors, consideration of the psychological, cultural and social aspects of
transition.
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Not pretending to suggest any immediate scenarios, referring to the evident situation
only, it is possible to argue that for the time being only banks, despite the above mentioned
complications, appear to be appropriate players in this game. Capital markets as such may
sound promising in particular cases, but cannot play an important role in general due to
the obvious lack of appropriate nancial potential of too many participants. Doubts and
uncertainty about nancial markets were expressed by Perotti (1994) and Peck (1995).
At the same time, as mentioned in section 2.3., it is by far not clear whether an alliance
of banks and enterprises is really going to end up with positive economic and institutional
changes of a large scale.
Another no less pragmatic challenge for corporate governance is, under what circum-
stances enterprise managers would be ready to exchange control over companies (or at
least part of it) for badly needed nancial inows? In other words, what kind and strength
of pressure from the market or from the state do they need to give up \opportunistic be-
havior" and act rationally from the position of enterprise interests?
5 Policy Implications
There is no question, that problems indicated can be | and, therefore, have to be |
solved only on the way of further progress of privatization, on the way of making it more
deep and consistent. Any attempts to reverse the results already achieved and turn the
process back would worsen the situation, not improve it. Based on this strong belief,
suggested policy recommendations are in line with the continuation and strengthening of
privatization policy.
A debate still takes place about whether state regulations are important for strength-
ening the Russian privatization process. Some experts claim, that the market will nalize
this job and no interference from the state is necessary. Others are arguing for serious
state intervention primarily in order to \correct mistakes" of the previous stages of pri-
vatization and then continue to regulate the process further, taking into account \state
and public interests". It seems that both extremes, as usual, do not represent a ratio-
nal, pragmatic approach or a realistic one. The second approach presupposes much more
cancellation than continuation of privatization. But the rst approach has another sort
of limitation: if the state remains indierent towards the obvious shortcomings, which
are typical to privatization and post-privatization nowadays, changes in ownership may
easily remain formal and much less productive than they could be in principle. Szelenyi
and others (1995) suggest a quite realistic statement that managerialism may not at
all be a transitory phenomenon. They underline, that key actors of economy and politics
have a vested interest to reproduce this phenomenon and there are signs that it begins to
enter a growth trajectory.
Vagueness and uncertainty of the current Russian statehood do not promise much
eciency from state policy in this quite complicated area, since it is also the area of
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strong controversy of interests and lobbying powers. But in our view, at least, the right
attempts ought to be made: something is better than nothing.
First, it is necessary to pursue the achievement of more or less ecient corporate gov-
ernance. Given the fact that the majority of enterprises is under the control of managers,
it means the necessity for the state to provide prevailing support for outsiders, despite
the aforementioned controversy regarding their behavior. This implies political, legal and
practical measures: any possibilities for satisfying managers in their attempts to get rid
of outsider investors other than through well motivated court decisions should be legally
prohibited and administratively (i.e., really) unattainable; access of outsiders to the enter-
prise capital has to be continued and enlarged by further selling the state shareholdings;
macroeconomic policy should remain anti-inational in order to, inter alia, prevent nan-
cial institutions from \making business" on ination | this may heat their interest in
industrial investment and sustain the protability of the latter.
Second, serious measures have to be undertaken to avoid any possibilities for con-
servation of the enterprises, that have been in continuous recession and nancial losses.
Enterprise restructuring, both in macro- and microeconomic aspects, has to be reinforced
in order to put an end to the inecient allocation of resources and to give more room
for the implementation of investors' strategies. This could be done through an active
policy of bankruptcies. Unfortunately, early beliefs that the great majority of restructur-
ing in Russia would take place without having to revert to bankruptcy, or assumptions
that bankruptcies themselves may not be as important for Russia as their threat (for
statements see: Enterprise Behavior and Privatization of the Large Enterprises in the
Russian Federation, in Economic Transition and Integration Project, 1993), appeared to
be unrealistic.
It is possible to say now, that the lack of bankruptcies has been one of the major
reasons for the enormous scale of conservation of inecient enterprises in Russia as well
as for relatively low eciency of privatization. The author would be happy to share the
optimism of Joskow and Schmalensee (1995) concerning liquidation and bankruptcy of
enterprises as part of industrial restructuring in Russia over the next few years, but there
is no current evidence for this sort of forecast.
Until now only a few cases of bankruptcies can be indicated due to badly targeted
and not instrumental state policy and the weakness of relevant market infrastructure.
The Federal Bankruptcy Department of the Russian Federation admits, that only among
the enterprises, partly owned by the state (in which the state posesses more than 25% of
the charter capital) 7.75% or 2,314 were insolvent as of December 1, 1995. (Open Media
Research Institute Economic Digest, No. 8, 1996-01-03). The introduction of really strong
measures for bankruptcy intensication, including the development of ecient market
(self-regulative) infrastructure for this process, seems to be critical.
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6 Summary and Conclusions
Ownership structure of the Russian privatized enterprises is in the process of development.
The major tendency is the steady dierentiation of insider stock on the shareholdings
of managers and those of non-managerial employees. Managers (rst of all | general
directors) concentrate more and more shares in their hands, willing to strengthen and
enlarge their own de facto controlling power, based on historic circumstances and initially
widely disseminated enterprise stock, by gradual obtaining major stakes in the enterprise
capital. Currently a bulk of companies is under their complete managerial control, which
is in the process of successful transformation into ownership control.
A fundamental fact has to be recognized, that so far formal allocation of shares (i.e.,
ownership structure) in the case of Russia does not coincide at all, on average, with the
patterns of real control. If outsiders do not have more or less sizable stakes (the absence
of which is still typical), despite formal proportions within the stake of insiders, control
rests in the hands of the general directors. Therefore, conclusions concerning enterprise
behavior could hardly be made on the basis of characteristics of the ownership structure.
In order to make the process of ownership concentration more consistent and irre-
versible, top managers create and strengthen in-enterprise managerial coalitions, which
prevent spontaneous circulation of shares and undermine possible protests towards \un-
fairness" from the side of non-managerial employees. Managerial coalitions are a peculiar
and signicant feature of on-going concentration of enterprise stock in Russia. Besides
in-house coalitions, managers have started to design the outside ones by pursuing the
mutual penetration of stock of technologically related companies. Thus, preconditions for
future changes of contemporary enterprise boundaries are emerging.
Enterprise executives attempt to regulate outside shares' circulation (i.e., nancial
markets) as well. For that purpose, satellite businesses, surrounding former state en-
teprises from the late 80s and being owned or controlled by managers, are used at large.
This is one of the reasons why registered stock acquisition may be completely misleading
from the standpoint of real ownership and control: stock of those satellites, which are
formally outsiders, in fact supplements the managerial stock.
Three years of large-scale privatization in Russia permit some conclusions to be made
concerning the characteristics of dierent types of shareholders. Most managers, as men-
tioned, intend to concentrate controlling stock in their own hands in order to exercise full
control over companies. Nevertheless, there are dierences in managerial behavior, and
the latter refer not only to the speed of such acquisitions, which is certainly discernible.
At least two managerial strategies have to be mentioned.
The rst strategy is followed by those enterprise top executives, who identify their per-
sonal future success and nancial wealth with the companies for which they are working.
Therefore, privatization in their minds, has strong links with ecient market adaptation
and restructuring. They privatize, ideally, in order to recover, continue and enlarge busi-
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nesses for their own long-term stability and benets. According to our observations, these
managers are in the minority.
The second strategy is followed by managers, who, because of dierent objective and
subjective reasons, do not identify their personal long-term interests and wealth with the
company for which they are currently in charge. Hence, privatization is accompanied
and followed by various forms of short-termism and even barbarism, aimed at as much
acceleration as possible of income and capital extraction from the enterprise in favor of
\opportunistic managers".
Both strategies have advantages and shortcomings | depending on from what stand-
point it is viewed. The rst strategy is advantageous for those who happen to be stock-
holders of a particular, potentially ecient enterprise and have the willingness, tolerance
and skills to keep their stake. The second is probably not bad from macroeconomic and
institutional points of view, since it means nothing more than an accelerated move to-
wards inevitable bancruptcies and the following reallocation of resources, i.e., to badly
needed structural changes. What seems challenging, is the fact that a good number of
enterprise executives are so far opposing their personal interests and interests
of companies for which they are in charge. This gap between privatization goals
and the actual eect of privatization on managerial incentives and behavior (although it
is resulting not only from privatization itself) may hamper the potential positive impact
of privatization on enterprise performance and the nature of entrepreneurial interests at
large.
Another important group of insiders | employees | does not demonstrate any posi-
tive impact of privatization on their incentives. The interest in dividends used to be the
strongest among the interests referring to privatization, in particular during 1993. Due to
the fact, that quite a few companies managed to provide dividends for shareholders and
the latter appeared to be of a rather modest size, this interest became less articulated.
The fraction of shares of the Russian industrial enterprises that is owned or controlled
by outsiders is still low, although there was a slight growth during 1994{1995. The problem
is, that demand from the side of investors for industrial enterprise stock remains not too
high | due to both lack of mobile resources within the nancial sector, and prospects of
Russian privatization and economic growth considered to be not clear enough. Another
crucial obstacle is the unwillingness of managers to exchange control and ownership for
monetary inows, which in principle might be provided by interested outsiders.
Actual outsider owners demonstrate no less controversial incentives and behavior, than
managers. In both groups there are positive and negative examples of governance, which
proved to be typical and therefore may be extrapolated. Hence, the problem of perfect
corporate governance does not seem to have synonymous solutions. Not disregarding the
basic principle, that corporate governance predetermines control proprietors over man-
agers, it makes sense to argue that real characteristics and eciency of enterprise
performance under Russian transition are more dependent on personalities
(individuals) in charge, than on what social and/or economic group they rep-
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resent. Following this statement, neither managers nor outsiders should be a priori
praised or disqualied.
The state has to continue playing a role in regulating the institutional changes. Three
major functions make a lot of sense and have to be activated. First, the state has to
prevent | both legally and administratively | any attempts for restitution of the former
state property, assuming that revisions of that sort have nothing to do with eciency and
fairness, but most likely reect interests of losers in the previous privatization rounds.
Second, the state has to pursue a well-targeted and instrumented policy of bankruptcies
in order to prevent the conservation of enterprises, that are in continuous and irreversible
losses. This might \open" enterprises for further privatization and substantial restructur-
ing. Third, the state has to improve the process of privatization of state packages of the
enterprise stock. Ideally, this process has to be transparent, competitive and free of any
presupposed solutions. Whether the contemporary Russian state is able to meet these
requirements and, therefore, provide positive impulses to further privatization, certainly
remains an open issue. But this is denitely a subject for another study.
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